In 1954 the late professor of maritime history at Leiden T.H. Milo published in the magazine Varia Historica his article titled “Het Nederlands hulpeskader voor Portugal (1641)”.(1) At that point the Dutch Republic was still at war with the Spanish Empire. The revolt in the Netherlands started in 1568 ending with a truce in 1648 and nowadays in Dutch history known as the Eighty Years War. Despite this war Dutch merchant shipping was expanding with the West India Company (W.I.C.) active along the coasts of South America and Africa and the East India Company (V.O.C.) active in the Far East where in both regions were Portuguese and Spanish interests.
In December 1640 the Portuguese declared their independence from Spain (since 1580 Portugal was part of the Spanish empire) and crowned Dom Juan de Braganza as their king. According to Milo the news of the independence became known in the Dutch Republic early in 1641. I have some doubts about this statement, I can’t imagine that the Dutch States General wasn’t aware what was going on in Europe especially while we were at war with Spain and that there were no sources of intelligence despite the extensive merchant shipping. However the States General decided 19 February 1641 after consultation of the five admiralties to fit out the ordinary annual squadron to serve off the Flemish coast and the so called ‘kruiseskaders’ (squadrons crossing on North Sea and elsewhere) but also to fit out an extraordinary 20 ships to serve off the Spanish coast and to aid the Portuguese crown. These 20 ships including 5 frigates were to be partly regular warships and partly hired merchant ships. It was quite common in the Dutch navy to use merchant ships for war duties. At least in the First and Second Anglo Dutch Wars (1652-1655 and 1665-1667) merchant ships were still active as (fighting) warships in battles. The extra ordinary ships were to be fitted out for a period of four months. The provinces (seven in totally) had to pay the costs - 300.000 Dutch guilders - above the ordinary annual amount for 15 March.
While the negotiations dealing with this extra amount still were going on appeared 3 April the Portuguese ambassador Tristan Mendoza de Furtado at the Dutch port Hellevoetsluis coming from Great Britain with proposals from the new Portuguese king Juan IV. Juan proposed an armistice for a period of 10 years and to be allowed to hire of buy warships on behalf of the Portuguese navy and recruit infantry and cavalry. The last two points were in fact hardly a problem, the armistice was. Both companies (V.O.C. and W.I.C.) opposed strongly as did the sea province Holland (nowadays North and South Holland but still with Amsterdam as capital city and The Hague as residence of the government). Holland was against fearing for reducing of the revenues coming from the companies, merchant shipping
and the privateering.
Finally all parties agreed for a treaty including an armistice for 10 years dating from the
moment the treaty was signed and immediately stopping the hostilities in Europe. However
in the Far East hostilities were to end a year after ratification (article 2) and dealing with the
South American area after ratification and public announcement (article 8).
The Dutch States General agreed to sent before the ratification a squadron of totally 20 ships (article 27), allowing the Portuguese crown to hire of buy 20 ships (article 28). (2). Except for the latter 20 ships, Portugal had to fit out at least another 10 galleons (article 29). The ratification was planned within 3 months after signing the treaty (22 June in The Hague). While negotiating with the Portuguese ambassador the States General also communicated with France which country agreed to sent also a squadron to Lisbon while the French Mediterranean fleet and an army were to attack Barcelona.
In the Netherlands preparations were made to fit out the extra ordinary squadron. However the admiralties suffered from large debts caused by the revolt/war since 1568 (despite the armistice 1609-1621) and the large costs of fitting out the fleet commanded by Maarten Harpertz Tromp which defeated the Spanish fleet commanded by Oquendo in the battle at the Downs.(3) The result was an inability of fitting out more ships than the regular warships to be sent to the Flemish coast as a protection against the privateers of Dunkirk. The decision was made to hire merchant ships while fitting out for war duties. A second problem was to find commanding officers for those ships while the admiralties didn’t want to expand their amount of sea officers in regular service. So a choose was made to appoint merchant captains and captains from both companies in temporarily military service.(4) Admiral of the squadron became Artus Gysels, vice-admiral Jacob Pietersz Tolck and as rear-admiral Michiel Adriaansz de Ruyter, the latter to become our greatest sea hero ever (5).
The squadron was gathered on 30 July before Scheveningen (a small fishery port nowadays in the province South-Holland). Due to storm and adverse wind the ships were forced to stay on the North Sea and were just on 12 August able to set course for the Channel. Lacking drinking water and adverse winds force the squadron to enter Downs.
At Downs the war council decided to split the squadron in three parts.(6).
Commanded by admiral Gysels with flag captain A. Vlugh were the ships the Prins, 38 guns, 116 men, captain A. Vlugh; fitted out admiralty of Amsterdam; Sint Andries, 36 guns, 115 men, captain H. Steuven; fitted out admiralty of Amsterdam; Drie Helden Davids, 36 guns. 91 men, captain R.C. van Sevenhuysen; fitted out admiralty of the Noorderkwartier; Prins van Portugal (7), 26 guns, 70 men, captain J. Leendertsz8; fitted out admiralty of Amsterdam; Engel Gabriël, 28 guns, 80 men, captain J. Solaes; fitted out admiralty of Amsterdam; Witte Engel, 30 guns, 94 guns, captain C. de Liefde; fitted out admiralty of the Maze and the Vlissingen, fregat, 20 guns, 70 guns, captain Pieter van Gorkom; fitted out admiralty of Zealand. The ships commanded by vice admiral Tolck were the Rode Leeuw, 37 guns, 118 men, vice admiral Tolck; fitted out admiralty of the Maze; Sint Maarten, 30 guns, 100 men, captain Fr.J. Touw; fitted out admiralty of the; Noorderkwartier, also known as the Groote Sint Marten; Hoop, 28 guns, 79 men, captain W. van Crimpen; fitted out admiralty of the Noorderkwartier; Sint Jacob, 26 guns, 90 men, captain C. van Vliet; fitted out admiralty of Amsterdam; Tyger, 20 guns, 54 men, captain M. Schaaf; fitted out admiralty of the Maze; Zwaan, 32 guns, 90 men, captain C. van Lemmen; fitted out admiralty of Amsterdam and the frigate Abrahams Offerrande, 20 guns, 80 men, captain C. Brackman; fitted out admiralty of Zealand and finally the ships commanded by rear admiral De Ruyter the Haas, 26 guns, 90 men, rear admiral De Ruyter; fitted out admiralty of Zealand; Roos, 36 guns, 95 men, captain G. van Saenen; fitted out admiralty of Zealand; Pelicaan, 32 guns, 94 men, captain J. Pauwelsz Cort; fitted out admiralty of Amsterdam; Gouden Leeuw, 24 guns. 74 men, captain P. Florisz; fitted out admiralty of the Maze; Graaf Maurits, 22 guns, 55 men, captain C.A. Oosterlingh; fitted out admiralty of the Noorderkwartier and the frigate Neptunus, 20 guns, 60 men, captain P. van de Keckhove; fitted out admiralty of Amsterdam
The frigates Vlissingen and Abrahams Offerrande were to serve as scouts and as aviso. If the Dutch squadron was permitted to act independent from the Portuguese-French fleet while attacking the Spanish the Dutch admiral choose for the well known tactics of boarding. He was instructed to sail first to Lisbon and there to join the Portuguese-French fleet. The Dutch States General ordered him to pursue for blockading the Spanish coast, while capturing Spanish merchant ships and if possible to cruise for the awaited Spanish silver fleet. Downs was departed 23 August but due to lack of wind the Dutch squadron arrived just on 11 September while the Portuguese-French fleet already left for Cadiz. Despite Gysels’ intention to join the Portuguese as soon as possible he had to refit and repair some of his ships and was forced to attend official affairs at the royal court. Seven days later finally the Dutch squadron left the Taag arriving 23 September off St. Lucar without seeing the allied fleet. The French 36 ships) joined 6 August the Portuguese (17 ships commanded admiral Antonio Telles de Menezes) and fought 11 September south of Cape Saint Vincent a Spanish fleet. To be able to go back to Lisbon the allied fleet sailed into the Atlantic missing the rendez vous at Cape Saint Vincent. Gysels decided to go to Cadiz without seeing the allied fleet. Here six of the Dutch ships entered the bay to find out if the silver fleet had arrived but finding instead a large Spanish fleet of warships. Fishermen at Tavira told that the allied fleet was to return soon to be able to attack the silver fleet. At Lagos Gysels got a letter from the Portuguese admiral asking to wait off Cape Saint Vincent and he waited there the whole month October. A stuff eastern wind forced the Dutch squadron to sail into the Atlantic course south-west. In the night 3-4 November there were some lights seen and next morning the Dutch squadron was to meet the large Spanish fleet coming out from Cadiz, totally 9 galleons, 4 frigates and a caravel expanded by a squadron ships from Dunkirk. During the night the Dutch squadron was scattered and just with luck the Dutch managed to organise two lines. In the harsh battle the Dutch lost the Zwaan and the Engel Gabriel with mostly of their crewmembers. The Dutch ships returned to the Taag between 6 and 8 November. Gysels later blamed the allies leaving him alone for more as a month. The Portuguese king however pointed the difficulties in the just liberated country with lacking money, sailors, guns and rigging. He pursued Gysels to join the Portuguese fleet and to sail out for the Spanish silver fleet. Gysels agreed if all 20 Portuguese ships were available. That was impossible, most of the Portuguese ships hired in the Netherlands with Dutch crews were even in worse condition as the Dutch squadron and still waiting for the payment. To make things worse, 21 December arrived the news that admiral Cornelis Jol (West India Company) captured the Portuguese possession Angola. According to Milo in Lisbon you could hear “Viva el Rey Dom Juan à morte todos los Flamincos and the Spanish fleet waiting for the silver fleet was in the meantime strengthened and now counting 28 galleons. While there were negotiations in the Hague for an armistice the West India Company had ordered prince Maurits in Brazil to captured as quickly and as many as possible Portuguese possessions, making abuse of the terms in the treaty. The Portuguese king gave all Dutch captains a golden chain trying to make the better of it. Despite this kind gesture Gysels wanted to go back to the Netherlands due the mutual suspect and the original planned four months were long expired. 4 January 1642 departed the Dutch squadron from the Taag arriving in the second half in the Netherlands.
In 1658 vice admiral De Ruyter was sent with a fleet to the Portuguese coast to destroy the Portuguese merchant shipping. The Dutch Republic was again in war with Portugal for the possessions in Brazil. Lucky enough both navies didn’t collide. There are more maritime relations between both countries for instance the selling of four ships-of-the-line in 1717 to Portugal and some years ago the sale of the Dutch frigate Van Nes to the Portuguese navy.
Notes
1. I translated the essentials of the original text while adding some new details. Milo used as sources the archives of the States General and of the admiralties of Amsterdam and Maze in the National Archive at The Hague. Strange enough he omitted the admiralty of Zealand while the decisions of this admiralty also includes interesting details dealing with the fitting out of the squadron, for instance inv. no. 2461-2642. For more see for instance P.J. Blok. Michiel Adriaanszoon de Ruyter, (The Hague 1944).
2. I still have to do some additional research if there were indeed ships acquired by the Portuguese crown in the Netherlands.
3. In this battle the Portuguese galleon Santa Tereza, built at Porto 1637 and part of the Spanish fleet was destroyed. See for more details for instance the pamphlet no. 4623 preserved at the Royal Libray at the Hague, published in 1639 with a list of all the ships serving in the Spanish fleet, mentioning the Teresa commanded by the former admiral Don Lope Offez, with 62 guns being a galleon of 1200 last.
4. In the future some of those captains were to be appointed in regular military service like Pieter van Gorkom.
5 In the National Archive at the Hague the journals of the voyage with the squadron written by Gysels and De Ruyter are still preserved.
6. For more details dealing with some of those ships see the Archive of the States General no. 12577-8 and the Archive of the Admiralties for Zealand no. 2461-2462. In the decisions of the admiralty of Zealand for instance for 18 May 1641 is an account of the negotiations of hiring ships from merchant Adriaen Lampsins from Flushing. For this important merchant and ships owner M.A. de Ruyter was active as merchant captain. Monthly rental price for the Haes was 3900 Dutch guilders. The flagship Prins had 116 men on board in stead of planned 120 and 36 instead of 38 guns. Her dimensions were 142 x 32½ x 14, height above 7.
7. According to one document also called Dom Theodoso Principe de Portugal.
