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Wednesday 20 November 2013

The Indian navy as described by Major-general Sir John Malcolm in 1833 part I

In his book dealing with the Government of India, Major-general Sir John Malcolm wrote an interesting note dealing with the Indian Navy as published in the Appendix A. Together with earlier notes published on this weblog, mainly dealing with the yard at Bombay, we slowly get an impression of the warships serving in British India.

p. 33 : 89. The orders of the Court of Directors regarding the organization of the Indian navy, with the nomination of a captain of the Royal Navy as superintendent, have effected a very complete reform in this branch of the service. The measures which have been adopted, and the success which has attended them, will be found in the several minutes I have recorded on the letters of the superintendent. Suffice it here to observe, that a greater and more beneficial change was never made in a shorter period. The vessels are in an excellent state; their crews are orderly, and the officers of every class have been placed upon a footing calculated to excite a high professional tone, and to elevate the character and the respectability of the service.
90. Regulations have been introduced which have greatly improved the efficiency of the service; and where that has been promoted by granting a more adequate remuneration to those
p. 34: who have trust and responsibility, the expense has been already more than met by the great saving made in the purchase of provisions, the expenditure of stores, and other items, all of which have been placed under a check and control, which, combined with that honourable feeling which now pervades the service, will prevent the recurrence of any of those abuses that have been remedied.
91. The Honourable Court of Directors, in their despatch of October 1st, 1827, ordered that the establishment of the Indian navy should consist of 1 frigate of 30 guns, 3 sloops, each of 24 guns, 4 ditto of 16 guns, 2 brigs of 10 guns and 2 steamers of 5 guns. It has been found practicable to fulfil the duties of the Indian navy with less than this establishment; and it now consists of 4 sloops, each of 18 guns, 3 vessels of 10 guns and 1 steamer. This does not include the Hastings, converted into a hulk, in the harbour of Bombay; the Aurora, now a floating chapel; the Palinurus, pilot vessel, now employed with the Benares on survey, nor the two old brigs, Thetis and Nautilus, which are still in the public employ, though not officered or equipped like those in the regular line of the service, the former having the commodore's flag at Surat, and the latter, which is not commanded by an officer of the Indian navy, being used to carry coal, and for such other purposes as occur when a ship of war is not required.
92. The expenses of the Indian navy have been greatly swelled, not only by survey vessels, and others in no way connected with this branch in particular, but by being mixed up with those of the dock-yard, naval stores, and the whole supply of timber for Bombay. Separated from these, however, its cost will, by a statement which accompanies this minute, appear very moderate for an arm of strength, which it is so essential to maintain in efficiency; and which, if the measures that have been taken are supported, will prove, (as I have elsewhere stated,) as a local force, useful in any future service the British navy may have to perform in India.
93. The Finance Committee have suggested, and the Supreme Government have recommended, on the ground of economy and their view of the actual state of the piratical tribes in the Persian Gulf, the reduction of the Indian navy to 2 vessels, each of 18 guns, 1 vessel of 10 guns and 1 steamer.
p. 35: On the measures which were recommended by the committee connected with this reduction, I shall make at present no remark: these embrace details which can only be understood by a perusal of their letter to the supreme government, reference to the data on which this is grounded, the letter of the superintendent in answer to the communication of their plan, and my minute noted in the margin [28 October 1830].
94. I have, on grounds that cannot, I think, be controverted, questioned the whole of the data on which the Finance Committee have arrived at the conclusion that trade would be efficiently protected, and our interests not injured, by relaxing our measures to keep down piracy in the Persian Gulf.
95. It is to me clear, that if attention to our pledges of faith as well as policy are neglected, and we cease to keep down that predatory spirit, which we have suppressed, but not yet destroyed, we shall improvidently cast away all the fruits of years of war and expenditure, and that loss of customs and the interruption of commerce, combined with insults and outrages upon our subjects, would soon compel us to have recourse to those expeditions which, without adequate benefit, would early render the measure recommended by the committee one of increased expense, instead of saving.
96. Since writing the minute to which I have alluded, I have conversed with some of the most intelligent European agents, on the trade with the Gulf of Persia, who informed me, that a great portion of the piece goods, before sent in English vessels from Calcutta, are now conveyed in small Arab and Indian craft from Bombay, and being at cheaper freight, the sale of such articles is increased, while the primary object of government is answered in gradually reducing predatory tribes, by giving to men and vessels formerly employed in piracy, honest and profitable occupation.
97. This fact, which is satisfactory as showing a cause for increasing sale of British manufacture, and as tending to change the habits of lawless men, is confessedly contrary to the interests of the owners of British ships formerly occupied in this trade; according to the evidence of Mr. Bruce ft (now a merchant at Calcutta,) these had formerly all that freight which he states is now carried on by Arabs. Though this change must be to the advantage of our manufactures, and is an object in which policy and humanity are united, as it tends to reclaim a race of barbarous men to order and civilization, it has, no doubt, in its commercial effects, been injurious to the interest of the port of Calcutta in the same ratio that it has been beneficial to that of Bombay and to the Arab merchants.
p. 36: 98. On the proposition of the committee to employ his Majesty’s ships of war in many of the services now allotted to the Indian navy, as stated in the tenth paragraph of their report, I have already given my opinion, that beyond sending or aiding expeditions, that plan cannot be carried into execution without alterations in the naval service of Great Britain and the government in India, which I believe are not likely to take place: but a comparative statement, which accompanies this minute, will show with what a great increase of expense this measure would be attended. It may be urged that this would be more than compensated by the superiority of British vessels of war, but it is my decided opinion, that for all purposes except actual fighting, his Majesty’s ships would be less efficient than those of the Indian navy; they would, in fact, be hazardous instruments to use for either conciliation or intimidation. Perfectly ignorant of the language, customs, and manners of those countries, their officers and men would be coming in constant collision with the most cherished feelings and prejudices of the rude inhabitants of the Arabian and Persian shores; and such causes, when combined with the irritability of temper and susceptibility to insult of these people, would be constantly committing our government and compromising its character. When, in addition to these considerations, due weight is given to the manifold evils and inconveniences likely to arise from divided authority, constant changes, and the youth and inexperience of commanders, and, above all, to the baneful and deleterious effects of the climate of the Persian Gulf, for many months of the year upon European constitutions - it is impossible to come to any other conclusion, than that the constant employment of his Majesty’s ships would be attended with any thing but advantage to the public service. I have elsewhere slated my opinion of the progress that may be anticipated in the Indian navy, supposing it maintained (as it ought to be, if maintained at all) as a high and honourable service; its merits will early be recognised by his Majesty’s navy, as fully as those of the Company's army are by the King’s troops with whom they serve; its European officers will have the advantage of the continued pursuit of the duties of their profession, and 1 see no reason why the native part of the crew should not in time be equal, in courage and discipline, to our native troops on shore.

Source
Major-general Sir John Malcolm. The Government of India. London, 1833. Digitized by Google.