British Royal Navy escorted 842 merchant ships according to the War Cabinet Weekly Résumé No. 45of the Naval, Military and Air Situation 4-12 July 1940

An item reported that this week totally the Royal Navy escorted 842 ships including 97 Allied and 40 neutral part of convoys and of which 7 were lost in action. The British naval escort consisted of 9 armed merchant cruisers, 29 destroyers, 16 sloops and 13 corvettes.

Source

National Archive UK. CAB-66-9-42. 

Capture by Germany of French channel harbors forced opening new convoy routes according to the War Cabinet Weekly Résumé No. 45of the Naval, Military and Air Situation 4-12 July 1940

An item reported that due the threat of German air attacks since the capture of the [French] channel harbors were the routes of the convoys by the Royal Navy changed. Outward bound was now north about from Southend, homeward bound via harbors on the West Coast. For coastal trace which needed to pass the Channel was a special convoy of 10 ships available to depart on alternate days from Southend and which was escorted as far as the Island Wight.

Source

National Archive UK. CAB-66-9-42. 

Neglible ships losses since outbreak of the Second World War according to the War Cabinet Weekly Résumé No. 64 of the Naval, Military and Air Situation 14-21 November 1940

An item reported that since the outbreak of the Second World War on 1 September 1939 35,447 British, 4,564 Allied and 4,147 Neutral merchant totally 44,158 ships were escorted. The losses were negligble regarded the given figures of escorted British ships 1:230 (154 lost), Allied ships 1:228 (20 lost) and Neutral 1:296 (14 lost), an average of 1:235 (188 lost), with other words of each 235 ships one was lost. The human factor is another story, each dead sailor is one too many.

Source

National Archive UK. CAB-66-13-37. 

Royal Navy lacking enough warships to escort Far East convoys in January 1942

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound (1) acting as First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff informed the Committee that the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean (2) supplied sailing dates of the convoys which were to leave the Mediterranean destined for the Far East. He feared for a possible delay of the departure of the first convoy if an adequate escort was lacking. The armoured brigade was part of the convoy and the War Cabinet accepted the risks if the convoy left without escort as far as Ceylon [nowadays Sri Lanka]. However the Australian formations which were to transported with the later convoys were to have priority in the way of escorts. Pound was to inform the involved Commanders-in-Chief.

Notes

1. Alfred Dudley Pickman Rogers Pound (29 August 1877 Ventnor, Isle of Wight-21 October 1943 London, England), served between 1891-1943 in the Royal Navy. First Sea Lord 12 June 1939-15 October 1943. Between October 1940-March 1942 he was chairman of the Chiefs of Staff.

2. That must be admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cummingham 7 January 1883 Rathmines, Ireland-12 June 1963 London, England) who was in April 1942 replaced by admiral Sir Henry D. Pridham-Wippell. Cummingham served in the Royal Navy between 1897-1946 with as end rank Admiral of the Fleet. As Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean he hoisted his flag on 6 June 1939 on board of the battleship HMS Warspite after arriving the day before at Alexandria, Egypt. At that moment was his main issue to keep the convoys destined for Egypt and Malta safe.

Source

The National Archives. CAB 79-17-20. War Cabinet. Chiefs of Staff Committee. Minutes of meeting held on Monday 19 January 1942 10:30 a.m. 

Rules for Allied and neutral merchant ships cruising off Gibraltar according to the Kriegsnachrichten of the Chef des Admiralstabes der Marine dated Berlin 14 August 1917

An item referred to submarine reconnaissance between end July-begin August steamships travelled west of Gibraltar between 250-270 degrees and according to a neutral captain to maximum 20 degrees west and then to the north. Usually was Gibraltar left in the evening nut also in the night going towards Gibraltar. Recently were in Gibraltar also convoys for the west assembled.

Source

Bundesarchiv RM-40-622

Large number of British and French warships needed for escorting convoys in December 1939

An item reported that on twelve separate shipping routes during the week ending on 13 December 444 ships were escorted including 24 Allied and 1 neutral. Up to 13 December were totally 4,705 ships escorted. In the week 7-14 December were 2 ships lost, since the outbreak fo the war 10. A large number of warships was active for escort duties. Except for 4 French destroyers and 4 submarines were employed 3 battleships, an aircraft carrier, 5 cruisers, 6 armed merchant cruisers, 41 destroyers, 13 escort vessels and 2 submarines.

Source

The National Archives, Kew Gardens, England CAB-66-4-13 Weekly Résumé (No. 15) of the naval, military and air situation from 0700 7 December to 0700 14 December 1939. 

Arms for Russia-- a great convoy of British ships escorted by Soviet fighter planes sails into Murmansk Harbour with vital supplies for the Red Army

World War Poster Collection. UNT Digital Library. Creator Blake.

German aircraft attacked convoy returning from Russia according to the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee. Daily summary dated 13 April 1942

An item reported that on 11 April German aircraft attacked a westbound convoy coming from Russia on about 120 nautical miles to the northward of Murmansk, Russia.

Source

Map Room Papers (Roosevelt Administration), 1942 - 1945. U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee. Daily summary No. 124 dated 13 April 1942

Autogiro’s a possible solution for air protection of convoys according to the Dutch magazine Marineblad dated 1939 no. 12

An item referred to the magazine Aeroplane dated 5 October 1939 dealing with the use of autogiro’s for protection of convoys. The medium speed of a convoy was usually just between the 10 and 15 miles. Common aircraft were far to fast for escort duties. Autogiro’s however were far more suitable, for instance with a wind power of 15 miles/hour straight ahead a 12 miles speed steaming convoy needed an autogiro a speed of just 27 miles/four to stay in front of the convoy. For a minimum sufficient protection were four autogiro’s needed, at each side one, one ahead and one aft. A merchant ship with the sized of a large coaster and a maximum speed of 15-20 miles was suitable to be used as mother ship. She needed to have enough storage capacity for 12 of those autogiro’s.